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Abstract:   
We develop and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that 
features sticky prices, a variable elasticity of demand facing firms and firm-specific 
labor. While reconciling to a good extent the micro and macro evidence on the 
behavior of prices, the model offers an accurate account of the dramatic increase in 
macroeconomic stability from the Great Inflation (1948:I-1979:II) to the Great 
Moderation (1984:I-2006:II). Reminiscent of the evidence in Shapiro and Watson 
(1988), the paper shows that labor-supply shocks are the key source of the reduction 
in the volatility of output growth, followed by investment-specific shocks. However, 
changes in the behavior of the private sector, a less accommodative monetary policy 
and smaller shocks explain almost evenly the large decline of the variability in 
inflation. 
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the reasons for the spectacular increase in macroeconomic stability from the
Great Inﬂation (1948:I-1979:II) to the Great Moderation (1984:I-2006:II). However, unlike previous
studies on the sources of the large declines in the volatilities of output growth and inﬂation, our
paper proposes a fully-articulated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the
postwar U.S. economy that also tries to reconcile for the ﬁrst time in this strand of literature the
evidence from microeconomic data suggesting that ﬁrms reoptimize prices relatively frequently with
that from aggregate time series about the inertial nature of the inﬂationary process. To this end,
we estimate a DSGE model of the U.S. economy that rests on two main pillars. First, following
Kimball (1995), price-setting monopolistic competitors face a variable elasticity of demand. Second,
building on Woodford (2003, chapter 3), labor is speciﬁc to the ﬁrm or industry. While implying
a plausible behavior of prices for the postwar period, our model captures close to 80 percent of
the sharp decline in the volatility of output growth and 86 percent of the fall in the variability of
inﬂation.
The volatilities of output growth and inﬂation have both decreased dramatically since the mid-
1980’s, with the former falling by 55 percent and the later by 65 percent (see the evidence presented
in Section 2).1 Three broad categories of explanations have been proposed so far. A ﬁrst category
suggests that signiﬁcant changes in economic institutions, technology, business practices, or other
structural features have increased the capacity of the economy to absorb shocks. For example,
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Kahn et al. (2002) argue that improved management
of business inventories, resulting from advances in computation and communication have reduced
ﬂuctuations in inventory stocks, thereby dampening the cyclical movements of output.2 A sec-
ond category, exempliﬁed by the work of Clarida et al. (2000) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006),
among others, contends that the Federal Reserve has fought inﬂation more aggressively after 1980,
increasing the stabilizing powers of monetary policy.3 A third category, known as the “good luck
hypothesis”, claims that the economy has been prone to much smaller disturbances after 1984.
1Further evidence on the Great Moderation can be found in Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003).
2Using a DSGE model, Iacoviello et al. (2007) provide evidence that changes in the volatility of inventory shocks,
or in structural parameters associated with inventories, have played a minor role in dampening the volatility of output
growth and inﬂation during the Great Moderation.
3Stock and Watson (2003), Sims and Zha (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007) argue that monetary policy had
a small impact on the decrease of the volatility of output growth during the Great Moderation.
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The benchmark model used for the purpose of our investigation embeds the following main
structural components: i) monopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated intermediate
goods, ii) nominal prices are set on the basis of Calvo-style contracts, iii) ﬁrms face a variable
elasticity of demand, iv) labor is speciﬁc to the ﬁrm, v) workers can vary their eﬀort, vi) preferences
are characterized by habit formation for consumption, vii) investment is costly to vary, and viii)
the Federal Reserve follows a Taylor-type of rule.
The economy is subjected to ﬁve structural shocks. Our choice of shocks is dictated by empirical
evidence reported in the literature on the identiﬁcation of the underlying sources of business-cycle
ﬂuctuations. Two are sources of technical change, two are random variations in preferences and
one is a shock to monetary policy. Inspired by a long line of research into the eﬀects of permanent
technology shocks, the ﬁrst one is a random-walk total factor productivity shock (e.g., Blanchard
and Quah, 1989; King et al., 1991; Gal´ı, 1999). The second is an investment-speciﬁc shock (e.g.,
Greenwood et al., 1988; Fisher, 2006). The third and the fourth shocks are to the marginal rate
of substitution between goods and work, one aﬀecting consumption directly in the utility function
(labeled consumption shock) (e.g., Baxter and King, 1991; Hall, 1997; Gal´ı and Rabanal, 2004)
and the other, hours worked (labeled labor supply shock) (Shapiro and Watson, 1988; Smets and
Wouters, 2003).4 The ﬁfth shock is to the Taylor rule.
As some other researchers do (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2003; Sims and Zha, 2006; Smets and
Wouters, 2007; Arias et al., 2007; Leduc and Sill, 2007; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2007), we ﬁnd
that smaller shocks are the key source of the declining volatility of output growth. However, unlike
other authors before us, we ﬁnd that labor supply shocks are the most signiﬁcant source of the
increased stability in output ﬂuctuations. Reminiscent of the evidence in Shapiro and Watson
(1988) showing that shifts in labor supply have been a key driving force of postwar U.S. business
cycles, our model assigns close to 50 percent of the fall in the volatility of output growth to smaller
labor supply shocks. We also ﬁnd that smaller investment-speciﬁc shocks account for nearly 22
percent of the decline in output ﬂuctuations. In contrast, the sources of the decline in the volatility
of inﬂation are spread almost evenly between changes in the behavior of the private sector, a less
accommodative monetary policy and smaller structural shocks.
While helping to understand the causes of the Great Moderation, our model also tries to rec-
oncile the micro and macro evidence on the behavior of prices. Using summary statistics from the
4Erceg et al. (2000) also build on the distinction between consumption shocks and leisure shocks in the utility
function.
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Consumer Price Index micro data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bils and Klenow
(2004) argue that ﬁrms change prices quite frequently, once every 4.3-5.5 months, whether they look
at posted prices or regular prices. Focusing on regular prices, Nakumara and Steinsson (2007) ﬁnd
that new prices are posted less frequently, once every 8-11 months. Still, the evidence in Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2008) points to a frequency of price changes which is somewhere in between–once
every 4 to 7 months on average–depending on the treatment of sale prices. On the other hand, a
look at the behavior of prices using time-series data suggests that inﬂation is quite persistent, with
positive autocorrelations out to lags of about three years (e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Gal´ı and
Gertler, 1999).
Calvo-style models of price reoptimization account for the statistical behavior of postwar U.S.
inﬂation, but only with estimates of the frequency of price reoptimization that are implausibly low.
To resolve the conﬂicting pictures between micro and macro evidence on prices, Altig et al. (2005)
and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) estimate a DSGE model in which ﬁrm-speciﬁc physical capital
is costly to adjust. Furthermore, the later authors also assume that monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms face a variable elasticity of demand. Here, we focus on a variable demand elasticity and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor.5 These ingredients imply that a ﬁrm’s marginal cost depends positively on its
own level of output. Thus, when a ﬁrm contemplates raising its price, it knows that a higher price
lowers demand and output. In turn, a lower output reduces marginal cost, other things equal,
giving the ﬁrm the incentive to post a lower price. As a result, aggregate inﬂation is less responsive
to a given aggregate marginal cost shock.
The estimation strategy is the following. First, the benchmark model is estimated with data
covering the postwar period from 1948:I to 2006:II. Our econometric procedure is similar to that
used by Ireland (2001, 2003). We ﬁnd that the frequency of price reoptimization predicted by our
model is once every two quarters on average. In contrast, with a constant demand elasticity and
integrated labor markets, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms reoptimize prices once every 5.4 quarters on average
(see also Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999). While predicting a relatively modest average amount of time
between price reoptimization, the model generates a substantial amount of persistence in inﬂation.
Furthermore, it yields a positive, serial correlation of output growth at short horizons, and hence
meets the challenge of generating plausible output dynamics (e.g., Cogley and Nason, 1995). The
model also closely matches the volatilities of output growth and inﬂation, and the correlation
5See also Edge (2002) who looks at the impact of staggered nominal contracts and ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor on the
transmission of monetary shocks from the perspective of a DSGE model calibrated to the U.S. postwar economy, and
Matheron (2006) who estimates a New Keynesian Phillips Curve with ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor using Euro data.
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between output growth and inﬂation over the postwar period.
We then reestimate the model with a sample of data for the Great Inﬂation and the Great
Moderation. The benchmark model closely matches the volatilities of output growth and inﬂation
in each subperiod. The model accounts for most of the sharp declines in the volatilities of out-
put growth and inﬂation, predicting a fall of 43 percent of the volatility of output growth and a
decrease of 56 percent of the variability in inﬂation after the mid-1980’s, not far from the actual
percentages.
We detect some statistically signiﬁcant changes in structural parameter values from the ﬁrst to
the second subperiod. Habit persistence decreases. The degree of investment adjustment costs in-
creases. The Federal Reserve’s tendency to smooth interest rates is weaker, and the Fed’s response
to deviations of inﬂation from target is stronger (see also Clarida et al. 2000). The response of
inﬂation to marginal cost decreases slightly, so the frequency of price reoptimization is marginally
higher during the second subperiod. Still, the average length of time between price reoptimization
always remains below three quarters in each subperiod. Lastly, we ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in the estimated variances of the shocks, but no strong evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant
change in the persistence of the stochastic processes generating the shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the changes in the volatility of
output growth and inﬂation from the Great Inﬂation to Great Moderation. Section 3 develops
our DSGE model with a variable elasticity of demand and ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor. Section 4 discusses
some econometric issues. Section 5 reports our empirical ﬁndings for the entire postwar period and
analyzes the results. Section 6 presents our results for the two subperiods and identiﬁes the sources
of the Great Moderation. Section 7 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Output Growth Volatility and Inflation Variability from the
Great Inflation to the Great Moderation
The volatilities of output growth and inﬂation have both considerably declined from the Great
Inﬂation to the Great Moderation.6 Figure 1 displays the evolution of the growth rate of output and
the rate of inﬂation from 1948:I to 2006:II.7 It also presents 20-quarter rolling standard deviations
6Following McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and others, we adopt 1984:I as the starting date of the Great
Moderation.
7Output is converted into per capita terms after being divided by the civilian noninstitutional population 16 years
and above.
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for these variables. The volatility of output growth has recorded two major declines, the ﬁrst
occurring between 1961 and 1965, and the second between 1984 and 1990. However, the recent
decline is more dramatic, with the volatility of output growth falling from a high 1.8 percent in
1984 to a low 0.45 percent in 1990. It has remained below 1 percent ever since.
The U.S. economy has also experienced a lengthy period of high inﬂation from the mid-1960s
to the early 1980s. However, there have been large declines both in the level and in the volatility
of inﬂation after 1984. The variability of inﬂation has decreased from a high 0.81 percent in 1984
to a low 0.25 percent in 2006.8
Table 1 reports the standard deviations of output growth and inﬂation, and the correlations
between output growth and inﬂation during the postwar period, the Great Inﬂation and the Great
Moderation. In all periods, output growth was considerably more volatile than inﬂation. Further-
more, the correlation between output growth and inﬂation was mildly negative. The volatility of
output growth declined by 55 percent and the variability of inﬂation by 65 percent from the Great
Inﬂation to the Great Moderation. Meanwhile, the correlation between the growth rate of output
and the inﬂation rate became increasingly negative, falling from −0.17 in the ﬁrst subperiod to
−0.31 in the second subperiod.
3 A DSGE Model with a Variable Elasticity of Demand, Firm-
Specific Labor and Nominal Price Rigidity
The economy is populated by a large number of members of a representative household, each
endowed with a diﬀerentiated labor skill indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. There is also a large number of ﬁrms,
each producing a diﬀerentiated intermediate good indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Following Woodford (2003,
chapter 3), a key feature of the model rests on the speciﬁcity of the labor relationship between a
particular ﬁrm or industry, and a particular type of skill. That is, the ith member of the household
supplies labor only to the jth ﬁrm, while the jth ﬁrm hires only the ith type of skill. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that i = j.
While labor is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, no single household’s member has monopoly power and no single
ﬁrm has monopsony power. Hence, a way to understand the speciﬁcity of the labor relationship
between the ith member of the household and the jth ﬁrm is to think of each point i on the unit
interval continuum as representing a large number of individuals supplying a speciﬁc type of labor
8We have also looked at Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data and found similar results.
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and of each point j on the unit interval continuum as representing a large number of ﬁrms employing
this particular type of skill. For example, we may think of factor speciﬁcity at the level of a region
or an industry.
3.1 The Household
The household’s preferences are described by the following expected utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c,tU(Ct, Ct−1)− h,t
∫ 1
0
V (Hi,t)di−
∫ 1
0
κ(ei,t)di
]
, (1)
where
U(Ct, Ct−1) = ln(Ct − bCt−1),
V (Hi,t) =
χh
1 + ηh
H1+ηhi,t ,
κ(ei) =
χe
1 + ηe
e
1+ηe
i,t .
β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, Ct is the aggregate consumption good in period t, and
Ct−1 is the habit reference level for consumption. The variables Hi,t and ei,t denote the hours
worked and the level of eﬀort of the ith member of the household, respectively. The parameter
b ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of habit formation for consumption; ηh and ηe are two positive
parameters. The household’s preferences are aﬀected by shocks to consumption c,t and hours
worked h,t. Both are described by ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes:
ln(c,t) = ρcln(c,t−1) + εc,t, (2)
ln(h,t) = ρhln(h,t−1) + εh,t, (3)
where 0 ≤ ρc < 1, 0 ≤ ρh < 1, and εc,t and εh,t are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated, and normally
distributed innovations with standard deviations σc and σh, respectively.
The household enters period t with bond holdings Bt−1, and a predetermined stock of physical
capital Kt which is rented to the intermediate-good ﬁrms at the real rental rateRkt . The household’s
member i supplies eﬀective hours worked ei,tHi,t to ﬁrm j at the nominal wage rate Wi,t. At the
end of period t, the household receives total nominal dividends Dt from the ﬁrms. The household
purchases Bt units of bonds, Ct units of an aggregate consumption good at the nominal price Pt,
and It units of an aggregate investment good from the ﬁnished-good ﬁrm.9 The household’s ﬂow
9We follow the standard practice of assuming complete ﬁnancial markets. This implies that the household’s
members are identical with respect to consumption and bond holdings. The source of heterogeneity between the
household’s members is produced only by the existence of segmented labor markets.
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budget constraint is:
Ct + It +
Bt
RtPt
≤ Bt−1
Pt
+
∫ 1
0
W ri,tei,tHi,tdi +R
k
t Kt +
Dt
Pt
. (4)
where W ri,t =
Wi,t
Pt
is the real wage of the ith member of the household, and Rt is the gross nominal
interest rate between periods t and t+1. We impose the explicit borrowing constraint Bt ≥ −B,B ≥
0 to prevent the household from running Ponzi schemes.
The stock of physical capital obeys the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + i,t(1− S(It/It−1))It, (5)
where δ is the rate of depreciation of physical capital. The second term on the right-hand side of
(5) embodies the investment adjustment costs. The function S(.) is positive, convex and satisﬁes
S(a) = S ′(a) = 0, where a determines the steady-state growth rate of output (see below).
Following Greenwood et al. (1988) and Fisher (2006), i,t is an investment-speciﬁc shock which
follows the ﬁrst-order autoregressive process:
ln(i,t) = ρiln(i,t−1) + εi,t, (6)
where 0 ≤ ρi < 1, and εi,t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed innovation
with standard deviation σi. The household maximizes the utility function (1) subject to the budget
constraint (4), and the capital accumulation equation (5). The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding
to this problem are:
(
c,t
Ct − bCt−1
)
− βbEt
(
c,t+1
Ct+1 − bCt
)
= Λt, (7a)
h,tχhH
ηh
i,t = W
r
i,tei,tΛt, (7b)
χee
ηe
i,t = W
r
i,tHi,tΛt, (7c)
Qt = βEt
[
Λt+1
Λt
(
Rkt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
)]
, (7d)
Qt =
1− βEt
[
Λt+1
Λt
Qt+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2
i,t+1
]
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′
(
It
It−1
)(
It
It−1
)]
i,t
, (7e)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (4). Equation (7a)
equals the marginal utility of date-t consumption to its opportunity cost. Equations (7b) and (7c)
equal the marginal disutility of hours and eﬀort to their respective earnings. The Euler condition
for capital (7d) says that the shadow price of installed capital, measured by marginal Tobin’s Q,
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equals the expected future value of Q net of depreciation plus the expected future return on capital.
Equation (7e) determines the optimal level of investment.
3.2 The Firms
The representative ﬁnished-good ﬁrm is perfectly competitive and produces Yt units of the
ﬁnished good, using the following general variety aggregator proposed by Kimball (1995):
∫ 1
0
G
(
Yi,t
Yt
)
di = 1, (8)
where Yi,t denotes the quantity of the intermediate good i used in the production of the composite
ﬁnished-good Yt. The function G(.) is increasing, strictly concave, and satisﬁes G(1) = 1. The
ﬁnished-good ﬁrm purchases Yi,t at the nominal price Pi,t. The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding
to the ﬁnished-good ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem is,
ζi,t = G′−1
(
Pi,t
Pt
∫ 1
0
G′(ζi,t).ζi,tdi
)
, (9)
where ζi,t = Yi,t/Yt, and G′(.) denotes the partial derivative of G(.). In the absence of proﬁts, the
nominal price Pt is given by,
Pt =
∫ 1
0
Pi,tG
′−1
(
Pi,t
Pt
∫ 1
0
G′(ζi,t).ζi,tdj
)
di. (10)
The intermediate-good ﬁrm i produces Yi,t units of a diﬀerentiated intermediate good i using ﬁrm-
speciﬁc eﬀective labor hours ei,tHi,t, and Ki,t units of the homogeneous stock of physical capital.
Hence, output Yi,t is produced through the following production function:
Yi,t =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Kαi,t(a,tei,tHi,t)
1−α − a,tΦ if Kαi,t(a,tei,tHi,t)1−α ≥ a,tΦ
0 otherwise,
(11)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of physical capital in the production of intermediate good i, Φ > 0 is
a common ﬁxed-cost term,10 and a,t is the labor-augmenting level of technology. The technology
shock is generated by the logarithmic random-walk process with drift:
ln(a,t) = ln(a) + ln(a,t−1) + εa,t, (12)
where εa,t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed innovation with standard
deviation σa.
10The inclusion of increasing returns to scale through the ﬁxed term cost allows the ﬁrms to earn zero proﬁts in
the steady state. Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) argue that during the postwar period, average pure proﬁts have
been close to zero in the U.S. economy. The price markup can thus be calibrated at a conventional value.
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Each period, cost minimization implies the following ﬁrst-order conditions for the representative
ﬁrm :
(1− α)
(
Yi,t + a,tΦ
ei,tHi,t
)
MCi,t = W ri,t, (13a)
α
(
Yi,t + a,tΦ
Ki,t
)
MCi,t = Rkt , (13b)
where MCi,t denotes ﬁrm’s i real marginal cost. Hence, ﬁrm i equates the marginal product of
each input to its shadow price. Nominal prices are set by contracts in a staggered fashion. In each
period, ﬁrm i faces probability 1− ξ of reoptimizing its price Pi,t. In a symmetric equilibrium, the
ﬁrms which are allowed to reoptimize prices in period t choose the same optimal price P ∗t . Proﬁt
maximization yields the following ﬁrst-order condition:
P ∗t
Pt
=
Et
∑∞
τ=0(βξ)
τ Λt+τ
Λt
(−ε(ζi,t+τ )MCi,t+τ )
Et
∑∞
τ=0(βξ)τ
Λt+τ
Λt
(
Pt
Pt+τ
(1− ε(ζi,t+τ ))
) . (14)
This equation determines the ﬁrm’s optimal relative price, ε(ζi,t) denoting the demand elasticity
of a diﬀerentiated good i deﬁned as ε(ζi,t) = −
(
G′(ζi,t)
G′′(ζi,t)ζi,t
)
. With perfectly ﬂexible prices, (14)
simpliﬁes to:
P ∗t
Pt
=
ε(ζi,t)
ε(ζi,t)− 1MCi,t,
which says that a ﬁrm’s optimal relative price is equal to the product of the markup and marginal
cost. The markup implied by Kimball’s (1995) speciﬁcation is time-varying.11 The aggregate price
level in (10) is determined by,
Pt = (1− ξ)P ∗t G′−1
(
P ∗t
Pt
∫ 1
0
G′(ζi,t).ζi,tdi
)
+ ξPt−1G′−1
(
Pt−1
Pt
∫ 1
0
G′(ζi,t).ζi,tdi
)
. (15)
Inﬂation dynamics is described by the Phillips Curve equation (see the appendix):
πt = βEtπt+1 + Γmct, (16)
where
Γ =
(1− βξ)(1− ξ)
ξ
ϕ−1.
From now on, a lower case variable denotes the log-deviation from its steady-state value of the
corresponding upper case variable; πt is the rate of inﬂation, i.e., πt = pt − pt−1, and mct is the
aggregate real marginal cost.
11It is constant under the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
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The response of inﬂation to marginal cost is measured by Γ, which is given by (see the appendix):
ϕ = 1 + ϕ1 + ϕ2, ϕ1, ϕ2 > 0. (17)
Here,ϕ1 follows from the assumption that ﬁrms face a variable demand elasticity, and ϕ2 from
assuming that labor is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Both parameters reduce the impact of marginal cost on
inﬂation.
The ﬁrst parameter is ϕ1 = µ, where µ = 1ε(1)−1 stands for the net price markup, ε(1) is the
demand elasticity of intermediate good i evaluated at the steady state, and  is the percent change
in the elasticity of demand following a one percent change in the relative price of the good evaluated
at the steady state. A Dixit-Stiglitz form of demand, i.e.  = 0 implies ϕ1 = 0, leading inﬂation to
be more responsive to marginal cost and less persistent.
The parameter ϕ2 is
ϕ2 = (ε(1)− 1)
[
A−B
(1 + α(A− B))IF − 1
]
,
where A = 1+ηh1−α and B =
(1+ηh)
2
(2+ηh+ηe)(1−α) . The indicator function I
F equals one if capital is homoge-
nous and mobile across ﬁrms as in the benchmark model, or 0 if capital is ﬁxed as in Sbordone
(2002) for example.12
To illustrate why ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor lowers the impact of marginal cost on inﬂation and increases
its persistence, we make the simplifying assumptions that capital is ﬁxed (IF = 0), eﬀort is constant
(ηe → ∞ and B = 0), and that demand is of the Dixit-Stiglitz form ( = 0). The Phillips Curve
equation becomes:
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1− βξ)(1− ξ)
ξ
(1 + ϕ′2)
−1mct, (18)
where
ϕ′2 = ε(1)
(
Y
Y +Φ
)
(1− α)−1(α + ηh).
Consider, for example, the case of an expansionary policy shock. With sticky prices, the policy
shock exerts an upward pressure on real wages, so a ﬁrm contemplates raising its price with or
without ﬁrm’s speciﬁc labor. With ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor, a ﬁrm’s labor demand depends positively
on its own level of output. In turn, a ﬁrm’s output depends negatively on its relative price. The
expansionary policy shock generates a rise in the ﬁrm’s relative price, putting a downward pressure
on the ﬁrm’s output, labor demand and real wages. The downward pressure on real wages thus
acts as a countervailing inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s incentive to raise its price.
12Notice that Y
Y +Φ
= ε(1)−1
ε(1)
, where Y denotes the steady-state level of output.
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The term ϕ′2 can be explained as follows. With the ﬁrm’s relative price rising, the ﬁrm’s level
of output falls by a factor of ε(1). The ﬁrm’s labor demand then decreases by
(
Y
Y +Φ
)
, so the
real wages decline by a factor of ηh. In turn, this lowers a ﬁrm’s real marginal cost by a factor of
(1− α)−1. Also, the higher the elasticity of labor demand (i.e. the higher α is), the smaller is the
adjustment of real wages and prices following the policy shock.13
3.3 The Monetary Policy Rule
The Federal Reserve sets the short-term nominal interest rate using a Taylor-type of rule:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) [ρππt + ρygyt] + εm,t. (19)
The variables πt and gyt stand for the deviations of inﬂation and output growth from their steady-
state values, whereas εm,t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed innovation
with standard deviation σm. The interest rate reaction function involves the output growth rate.
This speciﬁcation is consistent with the empirical analysis of interest rate determination in Erceg
and Levin (2003). Furthermore, as stressed by Orphanides and Williams (2002), it also ensures
that the mismeasurement of the potential level of output does not aﬀect the conduct of monetary
policy. Other examples of DSGE models in which Taylor rules feature the output growth rate
include Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004), Liu and Phaneuf (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
4 Econometric Procedures
We take a log-linear approximation of the model’s equilibrium conditions around the determin-
istic steady state. The resulting system of linear diﬀerence equations is solved using the methods
outlined in Klein (2000). The system can be written in its state-space form as
xt+1 = Υ1xt + Υ2εt+1,
zt = Υ3xt,
where xt is a vector of unobservable state variables, εt+1 is a vector that includes the ﬁve structural
shocks εa,t, εm,t, εc,t, εh,t, εi,t, and zt is a vector of observable variables. The elements of matrices
Υ1,Υ2, and Υ3 are functions of the deep parameters of the model. We estimate the system using
maximum likelihood methods and quarterly U.S. data on the following variables: the growth rate
13This can be seen more clearly from the log-linearized labor demand equation,
(
Y
Y +Φ
)
yi,t + mci,t = wi,t + hi,t
and the log-linearized marginal cost equation, mci,t = (1− α)wi,t + αrkt .
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of per capita consumption, the growth rate of per capita investment, the rate of inﬂation, and
the nominal interest rate. Let Θ be the vector of parameters that we intend to estimate and T
the number of observations on each variable. The Gaussian log likelihood function L(Θ) for the
sample {zt}Tt=1 can be constructed recursively using the Kalman ﬁlter described by Hamilton (1994,
chapter 13). The likelihood function (ignoring the constant term) is :
L(Θ) = −1
2
T∑
t=1
ln|Ωt| − 12
T∑
t=1
u′tΩ
−1
t ut,
where ut = zt−Eˆ(zt|zt−1, zt−2, ...z1), E(utu′t) = Ωt and Eˆ(.) denotes the linear projection operator.
The benchmark model includes 26 parameters related to preferences, technology, the shock
processes, and monetary policy. They are summarized by {β, δ, ηh, χh, ηe, χe, b, S ′′(a), α, Φ,
a, ρr, ρπ, ρg, ρc, ρh, ρi, Γ, ε(1), , ξ, σc, σh, σi, σa, σm}. Some parameters are calibrated prior
to estimation. The parameter δ takes a value of 0.025, implying an annualized rate of capital
depreciation of 10 percent. The share of physical capital into the production of intermediate goods
α is 0.36. The steady-state values of the nominal interest rate and a which determines the steady-
state growth rate of output are chosen to match the U.S. data over our sample. These values imply
β = 0.9935. The value assigned to χh in the utility function is such that the fraction of time
devoted to work is 0.30 in the steady state, while the value of χe implies that eﬀort equals one in
the steady state. We cannot simultaneously estimate ξ, ε(1), , and Γ. We set ε(1) = 10 in the
benchmark model, implying a gross price markup of 11 percent. The parameter  takes a value of
10, consistent with the symmetric translog speciﬁcation of Bergin and Feenstra (2000).
4.1 Data
Our sample of data runs from 1948:I to 2006:II.14 Real consumption is measured by the sum of
real personal consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services. Investment is the sum
of real personal consumption expenditures on durable goods and ﬁxed private investment. The
nominal interest rate is the Three-Month Treasury Bill rate. The price index is the price deﬂator
of output in the nonfarm business sector. The consumption and investment series are divided by
the civilian noninstitutional population 16 years and over.
14The data have been obtained from the Haver Analytics Economics Database.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates
We ﬁrst estimate the benchmark model using data for the entire postwar period. The results
are presented in Table 2. The structural parameters of the model are estimated quite precisely.
The point estimate of the coeﬃcient of habit formation for consumption b is 0.57. The point
estimate of 1/ηh in the utility function is 0.84, while that of 1/ηe is 0.14. These estimates imply an
intertemporal elasticity of labor supply of about 0.9. The degree of investment adjustment costs
S ′′(a) is 2.75, and hence is in the range of parameter values estimated by Christiano et al. (2005).
The interest-rate smoothing parameter ρr is 0.75, consistent with the evidence of Clarida et al.
(2000). The parameter ρπ measuring the Fed’s response to deviations of inﬂation from its steady-
state value is 1.53, close to the value advocated by Taylor (1993). The coeﬃcient ρy determining
the Fed’s response to deviations of output growth from its steady-state value is relatively small
at 0.15, consistent with the values reported by Gali and Rabanal (2004) and Smets and Wouters
(2007).
Looking at the shock-generating processes, we ﬁnd that the labor supply shock has the highest
AR(1) coeﬃcient with 0.8832, followed by the investment-speciﬁc shock with 0.7978, and by the
consumption shock with 0.5696. The labor supply shock has the largest estimated standard error
at 0.0726, followed by the investment-speciﬁc shock at 0.0343, the consumption shock at 0.0122,
the technology shock at 0.0115, and the policy shock at 0.0025.
The point estimate of Γ is 0.0432. The Calvo-probability of price non-reoptimization ξ can then
be recovered by assigning values to ε(1) and . Table 3 reports estimates of ξ and of the average
amount of time between price reoptimization for Γ = 0.0432, ε(1) = 10, and alternative values of .
We also contrast the results with and without ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor. These variants of the benchmark
model are all observationally equivalent with respect to the data.
Following Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), we use three diﬀerent values for : 0, 10 and 33. The
case  = 0 is one corresponding to a constant elasticity of demand, while  = 10 or 33 implies that
ﬁrms face a variable elasticity of demand. These parameter values encompass the calibration in
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007).
We look ﬁrst at the results obtained with ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor. With  = 10, ﬁrms reoptimize
prices once every 2.65 quarters on average, while with  = 33 prices are reoptimized once every
2.29 quarters. With a constant elasticity of demand, the average duration of price contracts is
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approximately three quarters.
Dropping the assumption of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor has a signiﬁcant impact on the results. With
 = 10, ﬁrms reoptimize prices once every 3.88 quarters on average. With  = 33, the frequency of
price reoptimization is once every 2.79 quarters. With a constant elasticity of demand, the average
amount of time between price reoptimization is 5.4 quarters. Thus, ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor signiﬁcantly
increases the frequency of price reoptimization.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the estimates obtained by others. Assuming ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital, a labor share of two thirds, a 10 percent markup, a 10 percent annual depreciation rate and
a degree of investment adjustment costs of 3.0, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) ﬁnd that the average
duration of price contracts equals 3.6, 3.3 and 2.9 quarters for  = 0, 10 and 33, respectively. Altig
et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the average amount of time between price reoptimization lies between 2.25
and 3.5 quarters for plausible markup values.
Theﬁrst two columns of Table 4 show that the benchmark model successfully reproduces the
volatilities of output growth and inﬂation during the postwar period. It predicts a volatility of
output growth of 0.0129, in comparison to 0.013 in the data. The variability of inﬂation predicted
by the model is 0.0064, compared to 0.0069 in the data. The model also produces the right
comovement between inﬂation and output growth with -0.0851, not far from the actual correlation
which is -0.2079.
5.2 Vector Autocorrelations
Following Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Ireland (2001, 2003), we compare the vector autocor-
relation functions from a vector autoregression and from the benchmark model. We estimate an
unconstrained fourth-order vector autoregression that includes the following variables: the growth
rate of per capita output, the rate of change of per capita hours worked and the rate of inﬂation.
First, we conduct a Phillips-Perron (1988) test of the presence of a unit root in per capita hours
and inﬂation (not reported). The null hypothesis of a unit root in per capita hours is not rejected
at the 5 percent level, whereas that of a unit root in the rate of inﬂation is rejected at the 5 percent
level.
Figure 2 plots the autocorrelation functions from the vector autoregression and from the bench-
mark model. The diagonal elements are the univariate autocorrelation functions for inﬂation, the
rate of change of per capita hours and the growth rate of per capita output, while the oﬀ-diagonal
elements are the lagged cross correlations between these variables. Inﬂation is highly persistent in
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the data, exhibiting positive serial correlation in the short run and the medium run. The growth
rates of per capita output and hours are positively serially correlated at an horizon of one and two
quarters. The benchmark model correctly predicts that inﬂation is more persistent than the growth
rates of output and hours. Furthremore, it implies a substantial amount of inﬂation persistence.
The model also produces positive autocorrelations in the growth rates of output and hours at a lag
of one and two quarters. Thus, the benchmark model is up to the challenge of delivering plausible
business-cycle dynamics. Cogley and Nason (1995) demonstrate that a large class of business cycle
models fails to account for output dynamics due to their weak internal propagation mechanisms.
The model also dos well in matching the lagged cross correlations between inﬂation, output growth
and the rate of change of hours.
5.3 Impulse-Response Functions
Figures 3 to 7 display the impulse responses of selected variables to each type of shock according
to the benchmark model. Figure 3 summarizes the eﬀects of a positive one percent technology
shock. The model generates gradual, permanent increases in output, investment and consumption,
consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Francis and Ramey (2005). Hours and eﬀort
decline in the short run and rise in the medium run. The short-run fall of hours is consistent with
the empirical ﬁndings of Gal´ı (1999), Francis and Ramey (2005) and Fernald (2007).15 The rise of
hours in the medium run is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding in Basu et al. (2006).
The factors that explain the short-run decline in hours are the nominal price rigidity (e.g.,
Gal´ı, 1999), habit persistence and investment adjustment costs (e.g., Francis and Ramey, 2005).
The drop in inﬂation resulting from the improvement in technology is smaller with nominal price
rigidity than it is with perfectly ﬂexible prices, implying smaller expansionary eﬀects on aggregate
demand and output. Habit formation and investment adjustment costs also dampen the short-run
increase in aggregate demand following a rise in wealth. Together, these factors imply that the rise
in aggregate demand does not keep up with the increase in total factor productivity, so hours (and
eﬀort) fall in the short run. The model also predicts that the real wage rises modestly in the short
run, and continues rising until it reaches a permanently higher level, consistent with the evidence
in Basu et al. (2006) and Liu and Phaneuf (2007).
Figure 4 summarizes the eﬀects of an expansionary monetary policy shock measured as a nega-
tive one percent shock to the nominal interest rate. The responses of output, consumption, invest-
15However, it is at odds with the evidence in Christiano et al. (2004) saying that hours rise following a technology
improvement.
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ment, hours and eﬀort all exhibit typical hump-shaped patterns. Note, however, that the eﬀects
of a policy shock on output, hours, consumption and investment are relatively modest. The policy
shock is also followed by a modest rise in inﬂation and a temporary increase in real wages.
Figure 5 shows that in response to a positive one percent consumption shock, both output
and consumption rise temporarily, while investment falls. Baxter and King (1991) report similar
ﬁndings. Hours, eﬀort and the real wage rise. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate weakly
increase.
Figure 6 plots the impulse responses to a negative one percent labor supply shock. Output,
hours, consumption and investment all increase sharply, and display pronounced hump-shaped
responses. Eﬀort falls. With a higher labor supply, the real wage falls. Inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate decrease.
Lastly, Figure 7 shows that following a positive one percent investment-speciﬁc shock, output,
investment, hours and eﬀort all signiﬁcantly rise in a hump-shaped fashion. After a short-run
decline, consumption rises for several periods. The real wage, inﬂation and the nominal interest
rate all rise.
5.4 Variance Decompositions
This subsection identiﬁes the sources of the cyclical variance of output, hours and inﬂation
during the postwar period. Table 5 features the variance decomposition of the forecast errors of
output, hours worked, and inﬂation over diﬀerent forecast horizons. The labor supply shock is
the main source of output ﬂuctuations at an horizon between one and twelve quarters, explaining
from 43 to 55 percent of the variance of output. Based on vector autoregression models, Shapiro
and Watson (1988) report similar percentages. Investment-speciﬁc shocks explain between 22 and
32 percent of the variance of output at similar horizons. Technology shocks explain less than
20 percent. The relatively small contribution of technology shocks predicted by our benchmark
model is broadly consistent with the evidence of Gal´ı (1999), Christiano et al. (2004) and Fisher
(2006). Consumption and monetary policy shocks explain only a small percentage of the variance
of output.
The variance of hours is mainly driven by labor supply shocks with 73 percent or more at all
forecast horizons. This leaves only 13 percent or so to investment-speciﬁc shocks at business-cycle
frequencies, and little to the other shocks.
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Inﬂation variance is largely explained by the labor supply and investment-speciﬁc shocks. Policy
shocks contribute to 11 percent of the variance of inﬂation at all horizons.
Summarizing the results presented in this subsection, we ﬁnd that the benchmark model implies
that labor supply shocks have been the most important source of output ﬂuctuations and inﬂation
variability during the postwar period, followed by investment-speciﬁc shocks.
6 From the Great Inflation to the Great Moderation
To what extent does the benchmark model account for the large declines in the volatilities of
output growth and inﬂation during the Great Moderation? We answer this question by reestimating
the benchmark model for the Great Inﬂation (1948:I to 1979:II) and for the Great Moderation
(1984:I to 2006:II).
6.1 Estimation results
The estimation results are presented in Table 2. The last column reports the Andrews and
Fair’s (1988) Wald statistics allowing a stability test of the structural parameters of the model
during the two subperiods. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant changes in the values of some structural
parameters from the ﬁrst to the second subperiod. The coeﬃcient of habit formation b decreases
after 1984, whereas the parameter S ′′(a) determining the degree of investment adjustment costs
increases.
The estimated standard errors of structural shocks are considerably smaller after 1984. The
investment-speciﬁc shock is 36 percent less volatile, followed by technology and labor supply shocks
with 33 percent, by consumption shocks with 30 percent, and by monetary policy shocks with 25
percent. However, these tests show that the AR(1) coeﬃcients of the shock-generating processes
have not been signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between subperiods.
Wealso ﬁnd that the Federal Reserve has fought inﬂation more aggressively after 1984, ρπ
increasing from 1.31 during the Great Inﬂation to 1.74 during the Great Moderation (see also
Clarida et al., 2000). However, we ﬁnd no evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant change in the Fed’s
reaction to the measure of output. The interest-rate smoothing parameter is somewhat smaller
during the second subperiod.
The estimate of Γ measuring the response of inﬂation to the real marginal cost is 0.0579 during
the Great Inﬂation and 0.0341 during the Great Moderation. Table 3 reports the average amount
of time between price reoptimization implied by these estimates. With Γ = 0.0579, the benchmark
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model says that ﬁrms reoptimize prices once every 2.32 quarters on average with  = 10 and once
every 2.04 quarters with  = 33. With Γ = 0.0341, the period of time between price reoptimization
is 2.93 quarters with  = 10 and 2.51 quarters with  = 33. Therefore, the frequency of price
reoptimization has slightly decreased during the Great Moderation. Smets and Wouters (2007)
estimate a DSGEmodel with a variable elasticity of demand without ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors and report
that the probability of price non-reoptimization increases from 0.55 during the Great Inﬂation to
0.73 during the Great Moderation.
Table 4 reports the volatilities of output growth and inﬂation during the two subperiods. Again,
the benchmark model accounts well for these statistics. The volatility of output growth predicted
by the model during the Great Inﬂation is 0.0142, not far from 0.0153 which is actually observed.
During the Great Moderation, the actual volatility of output growth is 0.0069, while the model
predicts a volatility of 0.0081. Concerning the volatility of inﬂation, the model predicts it is 0.008
during the Great Inﬂation, compared to 0.0078 in the data. During the Great Moderation, the
model’s prediction for the variability of inﬂation is 0.0035, in comparison to 0.0027 in the data.
Therefore, we conclude that the benchmark model successfully captures the severity of the
declines in the volatilities of output growth and inﬂation during the Great Moderation. While the
data tell us that the volatility of output growth has decreased by 55 percent, the model predicts
a decline of 43 percent. Also, while the variability of inﬂation has been 65 percent smaller during
the Great Moderation, the model generates a drop of 56 percent.
The benchmark model also correctly predicts that the correlation between output growth and
inﬂation was increasingly negative from the ﬁrst to the second subperiod.
6.2 What Are the Sources of the Great Moderation?
What are the sources of the reductions in the volatilities of output growth and inﬂation? We
answer this question by performing some counterfactual experiments. We partition the model’s
structural parameters into three subsets of parameters. The ﬁrst subset G1 regroups the parameters
pertaining to the behavior of the private sector and is given by G1 = {β, b, 1/ηh, 1/ηe, S ′′(a),Γ}.
The second, G2, is composed of the parameters describing the systematic portion of the Fed’s
policy rule and is G2 = {ρr, ρπ, ρg}. The third subset, G3, includes the AR(1) coeﬃcients and the
standard deviations of the structural shocks, i.e. G3 = {ρc, ρh, ρi, σc, σh, σi, σa, σm}. Denote by
Cx(G1), Cx(G2), and Cx(G3), respectively, the contributions of G1, G2, and G3 to the change in
the volatility of variable of interest x during the Great Moderation, where x = {output growth,
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inﬂation}. These contributions can be measured by (see also Leduc and Sill, 2007):
Cx(G1) =
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79
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σx(G791 , G
79
2 , G
79
3 )− σx(G841 , G842 , G843 )
Cx(G2) =
σx(G841 , G
79
2 , G
79
3 )− σx(G841 , G842 , G793 )
σx(G791 , G
79
2 , G
79
3 )− σx(G841 , G842 , G843 )
Cx(G3) =
σx(G841 , G
84
2 , G
79
3 )− σx(G841 , G842 , G843 )
σx(G791 , G
79
2 , G
79
3 )− σx(G841 , G842 , G843 )
For example, the term σx(G841 , G
79
2 , G
79
3 ) measures the standard deviation of x predicted by the
benchmark model during the second subperiod under the assumption that the properties of the
shock-generating processes and the parameters of the policy rule are the same as they were during
the ﬁrst subperiod. Hence, Cx(G1) measures the variation in percentage of the standard deviation
of x explained by the change in the behavior of the private sector G1. The denominator, which is
common to all three measures, denotes the overall change in the volatility of x. A similar reasoning
applies to other sources of variation in the standard deviation of x.
The results of these counterfactual experiments are reported in Table 6. Looking at the sources
of the decline in the volatility of output growth during the Great Moderation, we ﬁnd that smaller
shocks explain almost 85 percent of the decrease in output ﬂuctuations, leaving about 15 percent to
be explained by changes in the behavior of the private sector and monetary policy. Table 7 shows
that smaller labor supply shocks explain almost 50 percent of the decline in output ﬂuctuations,
followed by smaller investment-speciﬁc shocks with 22 percent.
Looking at the decline in the variability of inﬂation during the Great Moderation, we ﬁnd that
smaller shocks explain only one third of it, leaving 32.5 and 34.3 percent, respectively, to changes
in the behavior of the private sector and monetary policy.
6.3 Related Literature
Other researchers, including Stock and Watson (2003), Sims and Zha (2006), Smets and Wouters
(2007), Arias et al. (2007), Leduc and Sill (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) also ﬁnd that
the sharp decline in the volatility of output growth during the Great Moderation results mostly
from smaller structural shocks.
Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate a DSGE model with nominal rigidities, real frictions, a
variable elasticity of demand and homogeneous factors. Their model overpredicts the volatility of
output growth by 11.9 percent during the ﬁrst subperiod and by 23.7 percent during the second
subperiod. In comparison, our benchmark model underpredicts the volatility of output growth
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by 7.2 percent during the Great Inﬂation and overpredicts it by 17.3 percent during the Great
Moderation. Their model also overpredicts the variability of inﬂation by 47.2 percent during the
ﬁrst subperiod and by 36 percent during the second subperiod. In comparison, our benchmark
model overpredicts the variability of inﬂation by a small 2.5 percent during the Great Inﬂation and
by 29.6 percent during the Great Moderation.16
The papers by Arias et al. (2007) and Leduc and Sill (2007) identify smaller TFP shocks as the
main source of the decline in output ﬂuctuations. Based on a calibrated RBC model of the kind
proposed by Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) and featuring variable capacity utilization, variable
eﬀort and indivisible labor, Arias et al. study the sources of the decrease in the volatility of output
growth without looking at the causes of the decline in the volatility of inﬂation. It is well known,
however, that RBC models grossly overpredict the variability of inﬂation in response to TFP shocks
as these models rest on the assumption of perfectly ﬂexible prices (see Liu and Phaneuf, 2007).
Leduc and Sill develop a sticky-price model that incorporates an energy sector and where ﬁrms face
quadratic price-adjustment costs. While capturing to some extent the severity of the large decline
in output ﬂuctuations, their model considerably underpredicts the volatility of inﬂation which is
6.6 times smaller than found in the data.
An interesting paper by Justiniano and Primiceri (2007) estimates a DSGE model with nominal
rigidities, real frictions and several types of shocks allowing for time variation in the volatility of
the structural innovations. Our studies share a common result. Both papers ﬁnd that changes in
monetary policy and the private sector behavior have reduced the variability of inﬂation, but not
the volatility of output growth. Their paper singles out a sharp decline in the variability of a shock
speciﬁc to the equilibrium condition of investment as the source of the decrease in the volatility of
output growth during the Great Moderation. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, but somewhat smaller role
for investment-speciﬁc shocks.17
16Unfortunately, their estimation results do not single out among the structural shocks included in their model
which contributes most to the reduced volatility of output growth.
17Besides diﬀerences in the estimation procedures used in the two papers, our paper diﬀers in another important
respect. While the objective of reconciling the micro and macro evidence about the behavior of prices is central to
our modeling strategy, it is not in Justiniano and Primiceri. So our estimated models have very diﬀerent implications
for the frequency of price reoptimization. While our estimates are consistent with a frequency of price reoptimization
between 6 and 9 months, their estimated Calvo-probabilities of price non reoptimization generally imply that prices
are reoptimized once every 2.5 years on average.
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7 Conclusion
Recently, Hall (1997) has forcefully argued that the emphasis on technology shocks in business
cycle theory may have been misplaced, oﬀering evidence that the main driving force behind aggre-
gate ﬂuctuations are shifts in the marginal rate of substitution between goods and work. We have
provided new evidence, consistent with Hall’s contention and the ﬁndings of Shapiro and Watson
(1988), that shifts in labor supply have been the prime driving force of postwar business cycles.
Furthermore, we have established that labor supply shocks account in large part for the decline in
output ﬂuctuations during the Great Moderation, followed by investment-speciﬁc shocks. However,
we have found that the large drop in the volatility of inﬂation is explained almost evenly by changes
in the behavior of the private sector, a less accommodative monetary policy and smaller shocks.
The DSGE framework used for the purpose of our investigation is built on the premises that
price-setting ﬁrms face a variable elasticity of demand and that labor is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. These as-
sumptions help resolve the conﬂicting pictures between microeconomic evidence indicating that
ﬁrms reoptimize prices quite frequently with the evidence from aggregate time series that inﬂation
is quite persistent.
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Appendix
This appendix brieﬂy shows how the Phillips curve equation (16) is derived. First, recall that
ε(1) denotes the demand elasticity of intermediate good i evaluated at the steady state. We linearize
the ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁnished-good ﬁrm’s problem (9), the no-proﬁt condition for the
ﬁnished-good ﬁrm (15), and the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal price of the intermediate-good
ﬁrm (14). These equations are:
yi,t+τ − yt+τ = −ε(1)(p∗t − pt+τ ), (i)
p∗t − pt =
ξ
(1− ξ)πt, (ii)
1
(1− βξ) (p
∗
t − pt) = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βξ)τ [mci,t+τ + pt+τ − pt − ϕ1(p∗t − pt+τ )], (iii)
where
ϕ1 =
⎛
⎝1 +
(
1 + G
′′′(1)
G′′(1)
)
ε(1)
ε(1)− 1
⎞
⎠ .
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004, appendix) show that 1+
(
1 + G
′′′(1)
G′′(1)
)
ε(1) = , where  is the percent
change in the elasticity of demand due to a one percent change in the relative price of the good,
evaluated at the steady state. From the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions, we have :
(1 + ηe)ei,t+τ = (1 + ηh)hi,t+τ . (iv)
The real marginal cost of ﬁrm i is related to the aggregate real marginal cost by:
mci,t+τ = mct+τ − ϕ2(p∗t − pt+τ ), (v)
where
ϕ2 = (ε(1)− 1)
[
A−B
(1 + α(A−B))IF − 1
]
, A =
(
1 + ηh
1− α
)
, B =
(
(1 + ηh)2
(2 + ηh + ηe)(1− α)
)
,
and IF is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if capital is homogenous and mobile across ﬁrms,
and a value of 0 if capital is ﬁxed. Note that as ηe −→∞, then B −→ 0. Substituting (i), (ii), (iv)
and (v) in (iii) and rearranging, we obtain equation (16) in the paper:
πt = βEtπt+1 + Γmct,
where Γ = (1−βξ)(1−ξ)ξ ϕ
−1, and ϕ = 1 + ϕ1 + ϕ2.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Output Growth
and Inflation
1948:I-2006:II 1948:I-1979:II 1984:I-2006:II
Output growth 0.0130 0.0153 0.0069
Inﬂation 0.0069 0.0078 0.0027
corr(∆yt, πt) -0.2079 -0.1672 -0.3104
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Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
1948:I-2006:II 1948:I-1979:II 1984:I-2006:II
Parameter Estimate S.E Estimate S.E Estimate S.E W statistic
b 0.5713 0.0012 0.5938 0.0104 0.5598 0.0010 10.6521***
1/ηh 0.8496 0.0010 0.8204 0.2133 0.8618 0.0119 0.0377
1/ηe 0.1484 0.0081 0.1229 0.0887 0.1551 0.0018 0.1315
S ′′(a) 2.7520 0.0192 2.6416 0.0092 3.1621 0.2882 3.2585*
ρr 0.7542 0.0234 0.7861 0.0260 0.7433 0.0001 2.7278*
ρπ 1.5295 0.1337 1.3143 0.0079 1.7401 0.1595 7.1105***
ρy 0.1511 0.0652 0.1739 0.0611 0.1428 0.0732 0.1060
ρc 0.5696 0.0461 0.5903 0.0068 0.5477 0.1530 0.0773
ρh 0.8832 0.0198 0.9090 0.0101 0.8621 0.0240 3.2368*
ρi 0.7918 0.0336 0.7536 0.0709 0.7738 0.0109 0.0789
Γ 0.0432 0.0125 0.0579 0.0004 0.0341 0.0055 18.3266***
σa 0.0115 0.0027 0.0128 0.0039 0.0086 0.0038 0.6016
σm 0.0025 0.0002 0.0020 0.0002 0.0015 0.0001 4.6748**
σc 0.0122 0.0010 0.0134 0.0012 0.0094 0.0014 4.7707**
σh 0.0726 0.0118 0.0733 0.0104 0.0488 0.0038 4.8841**
σi 0.0343 0.0030 0.0371 0.0040 0.0238 0.0012 9.9570***
Note: S.E denotes the standard deviation. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 3: Implied Frequency of Price Reoptimization
Homogeneous labor Speciﬁc labor
 = 0  = 10  = 33  = 0  = 10  = 33
1948:I-2006:II
ξ 0.815 0.7422 0.6423 0.6563 0.6233 0.5637
1/(1− ξ) 5.4052 3.8794 2.7953 2.9099 2.6544 2.2919
1948:I-1979:II
ξ 0.7879 0.7073 0.5989 0.6035 0.5698 0.5094
1/(1− ξ) 4.7149 3.4165 2.493 2.5218 2.3245 2.0383
1984:I-2006:II
ξ 0.834 0.7674 0.6746 0.6905 0.6591 0.602
1/(1− ξ) 6.0257 4.2999 3.0727 3.2313 2.933 2.5125
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Table 4: Output Growth and Inflation:
Standard Deviations and Correlations
1948:I-2006:II 1948:I-1979:II 1984:I-2006:II
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output growth 0.0130 0.0129 0.0153 0.0142 0.0069 0.0081
Inﬂation 0.0069 0.0064 0.0078 0.0080 0.0027 0.0035
corr(∆yt, πt) -0.2079 -0.0851 -0.1672 -0.0583 -0.3104 -0.1461
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Table 5: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (1948:I-2006:II)
Output
Horizons Technology Monetary policy Consumption Labor supply Investment
1 9.5055 6.1120 10.1568 42.5481 31.6776
4 11.9442 2.6982 2.7433 53.8372 28.7771
8 15.6078 1.3945 1.1437 56.9637 24.8903
20 29.7602 0.7397 0.5854 50.1616 18.7531
40 49.4559 0.5009 0.3949 36.2612 13.3871
100 74.3662 0.2528 0.1992 18.3844 6.7975
Hours worked
Horizons Technology Monetary policy Consumption Labor supply Investment
1 6.3384 2.5617 4.2570 73.5662 13.2768
4 1.2622 1.8642 2.0406 78.8516 15.9814
8 0.8186 1.1641 1.1084 83.3553 13.5535
20 1.0844 0.9022 0.8531 86.0103 11.1501
40 1.2658 0.8945 0.8433 85.3536 11.6428
100 1.2903 0.8925 0.8410 85.2350 11.7412
Inflation
Horizons Technology Monetary policy Consumption Labor supply Investment
1 0.5180 11.8608 1.3689 61.9231 24.3292
4 0.4848 12.2765 1.3148 48.3301 37.5939
8 1.3026 11.8163 1.2281 45.0892 40.5638
20 2.8080 11.4288 1.1894 43.9853 40.5885
40 3.2304 10.9257 1.1383 43.7724 40.9331
100 3.2762 10.8197 1.1274 43.8799 40.8968
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Table 6: Sources of Reductions in the Volatilities
of Output Growth and Inflation (in %)
Private sector Monetary policy Shocks
Output growth 9.2 5.9 84.9
Inﬂation 32.5 34.3 33.2
Table 7: Contribution of Shocks to the Reductions in the Volatilities
of Output Growth and Inflation (in %)
Technology Monetary policy Consumption Labor supply Investment
Output growth 0.07 0.01 0.05 49.92 21.82
Inﬂation 0.01 0.02 0.005 0.16 0.14
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Figure 1: Output growth and inflation
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Figure 2: Vector Autocorrelation Functions: Benchmark Model vs Vector
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Consumption Shock
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Labor Supply Shock
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses to an Investment-Specific Shock
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